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Introduction 
The printing press, introduced into England in the 1460s or 1470s, is an early example of innovative 
technology.1 Since then the legal system in England, and later in Australia, has struggled to deal with issues 
relating to the control of innovative technologies which enable the broad dissemination of information. 
These issues include censorship; in other words, control over the subject matter of the content, and 
copyright; in other words, control of the ownership of the content.  
 
This article examines how the Australian legal system manages copyright issues related to the development 
of innovative technologies, focusing in particular on how the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (CA) enforces the 
effect of ‘technological protection measures’ (TPMs) and ‘access control protection measures’ (ACTPMs) 
by proscribing the use of ‘circumvention devices’. TPMs are the means by which the copyright in certain 
electronic products is protected: ‘A TPM is something designed to prevent or inhibit the infringement of 
copyright by allowing access only to authorised users (for example, by requiring a password) and/or 
through a copy control mechanism.’2 
 
An ACTPM controls access to the work or other subject matter.3 A circumvention device is a ‘device, 
component or product (including a computer program)’, which nullifies the effect of the TPM/ACTPM.4 In 
April 2007 Australia acceded to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performers and 
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), as required by the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA). 
Both treaties have provisions referring to TPMs and circumvention devices. The preambles of both treaties 
are similar and refer to a desire ‘to develop and maintain the rights of authors’ (in the case of the WCT) and 
‘performers and producers of phonograms’ (in the case of the WPPT). The preambles continue that the 
provisions were introduced in recognition of ‘the need to introduce new international rules and clarify the 
interpretation of certain existing rules in order to provide adequate solutions to the questions raised by new 
economic, social, cultural and technological developments’.5 
 
The law of copyright is an attempt to balance the competing interests of the copyright owner, by providing 
a limited term monopoly, and the copyright user. The relevance to business in the context of 
TPMs/ACTPMs and circumvention devices has two aspects. On the one hand, companies such as the Sony 
Corporation invest heavily in innovative technologies and embed TPMs/ACTPMs into their products to 
prevent breach of their copyright. Their concern is that their economic interests should be protected by the 
proscription of circumvention devices. On the other hand, there are businesses who argue, for example, that 
                                                 
1 F Siebert, Freedom of the Press in England 1476-1776 (1952) 22-24, discusses the possibility of the date for the 
introduction of printing into England being some eight years earlier than 1476 when Caxton was credited with setting 
up the first press.  
2 Australian Copyright Council, Information Sheet G50 Copyright and Computer software (2005) 5 
<www.copyright.org.au> at 27 April 2008. 
3 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1). 
4 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1). 
5 <www.wipo.int/treaties> at 5 September 2008. 
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circumvention devices enable what would otherwise be legal uses as well as illegal uses of the product and 
that TPMs/ACTPMs are anti-competitive. Critics in the latter category include businesses whose sole 
function is either to manufacture circumvention devices, or to insert them into the product (or both). 
 
A fundamental problem is that the legal requirements for the subsistence of copyright demonstrate a ‘hard 
copy’ mentality that does not always sit comfortably in the digital age. Ideas are not protected: ‘Copyright 
protection extends to expression and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical 
concepts as such’.6  
 
The first requirement is for material form. The material form must a Part III ‘work’, which includes original 
literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, or Part IV ‘other subject matter’ which includes sound 
recordings, films, television broadcasts and sound broadcasts, and published editions of works. In the 
digital age the copyright claim may be with respect to something which is not even visible, for example 
electrical impulses.  
 
The second requirement is that the ‘work’ or ‘other subject matter’ be original.7 The requirement is not for 
any high level of ingenuity or intellect; ‘… the Act does not require that the expression must be in an 
original or novel form, but that the work must not be copied from another work – that it should originate 
from the author’.8 For infringement to occur the copying must be of a ‘substantial’ part.9 In this context it 
is the quality of what is copied, in the sense of being an important part, that is assessed. In some 
circumstances this may be only a small part of the whole, for example a few bars from a musical 
composition that is instantly recognisable. In other circumstances the assessment may be of a more 
quantitative nature, looking at how much in total is copied.10 In the digital age it is often difficult to assess 
how much, or even what part, of a computer program is ‘substantial’ for the purposes of infringement.11 
 
The article begins with Autodesk v Dyason [1992] HCA 2 (Autodesk), an early High Court decision relating 
to a circumvention device. The article then examines the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 
(Cth) which introduced the first of the provisions in the CA covering TPMs and circumvention devices. 
This is followed by a discussion of Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment & Ors 
                                                 
6 Australian Copyright Council, Key points about copyright (2008) <www.copyright.org.au> at 1 May 08; Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), 1994, art 9(2): ‘Copyright protection 
shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such’. 
7 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt III – Copyright in original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works. Originality is an 
implied requirement for pt IV ‘other subject matter’; J McKeough, A Stewart and P Griffith, Intellectual Property In 
Australia (2004) para 6.15. 
8 University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 607, 608. 
9 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 14. 
10 Australian Copyright Council, Information Sheet GO63v08 Infringement (2007) 2 <www.copyright.org.au> at 01 
May 08. 
11 See, for example, Autodesk v Dyason [1992] HCA 2, and the associated criticism by the Copyright Law Review 
Committee in its report on Computer Software Protection (1995) para 5.24-5.25. 
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[2005] HCA 58 (Stevens). Consideration is then given to the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) which 
amended provisions in the CA relating to TPMs and circumvention devices, and including for the first time 
protection for ACTPMs. Finally there is a brief review of some of the criticisms of the protection currently 
given to ACTPMs by the CA. 
 
The decision in Autodesk Inc v Dyason12 
The facts of Autodesk centred on a form of TPM. In this case the High Court considered the definitions in s 
10(1) of the CA, as amended by Copyright Amendment Act 1984 (Cth).13 Autodesk, the applicants, owned 
copyright in a complex computer software program called AutoCAD, the CAD standing for ‘computer 
assisted drafting’. The program facilitates the making of complex three dimensional drawings for use in 
drafting architectural or engineering designs.14 To prevent piracy and restrict the use of the program to one 
computer only, which would increase sales, Autodesk developed an ‘AutoCAD lock’. The AutoCAD lock 
was a hardware lock which had to be plugged into the computer to enable the software to run on that 
particular computer. This operated in two parts; the first was a set of instructions in the software program 
known as the ‘Widget C’, the second was the AutoCAD lock itself.15 Every few seconds during the use of 
the AutoCAD program, Widget C would require the computer to challenge the AutoCAD lock, which 
would then respond to Widget C. If the response was deemed satisfactory by Widget C the program would 
continue to run, otherwise it would stop.16  
 
The defendants, Peter Kelly, Patrick Dyason and Christine Dyason, manufactured and sold a device called 
the ‘Auto Key lock’, designed by Kelly, which duplicated the operation of the AutoCAD lock.17 Kelly 
devised the Auto Key lock with the use of an oscilloscope which read the electronic signals passing 
between the computer, the lock and the Widget C. Kelly then stored this information on a semiconductor 
chip which behaved in the same way as the AutoCAD lock. He did this without reverse engineering the 
AutoCAD lock, or the Widget C.18 AutoCAD cost about $5,200, the Auto Key lock, which enabled the use 
of the AutoCAD program on more than one computer, and therefore made pirating easier, about $500.19  
 
Autodesk sued for infringement of copyright, on the basis that the Widget C was a computer program 
within the definition of ‘literary work’ in 10(1) of the CA, as amended by Copyright Amendment Act 1984 
(Cth). Autodesk was successful at trial before Northrop J, who gave a wide interpretation to the meaning of 
‘computer program’ which for him brought the AutoCAD lock and the Auto Key lock within the definition. 
                                                 
12 Autodesk v Dyason [1992] HCA 2 <www.austlii.edu.au> at 27 April 2008. 
13 The Copyright Amendment Act 1984 (Cth) amended the CA to include computer programs within the definition of 
literary works in s 10(1). 
14 Autodesk v Dyason [1992] HCA 2, para 1(Dawson J) <www.austlii.edu.au> at 27 April 2008. 
15 Autodesk v Dyason above n 14, para 2. 
16 Autodesk v Dyason above n 14, para 9. 
17 Autodesk v Dyason above n 14, headnote. 
18 Autodesk v Dyason above n 14, paras 14-15. 
19 Autodesk v Dyason above n 14, paras 2-3. 
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He then found the latter to be a reproduction of the former. This was overturned on appeal to the Full Court 
of the Federal Court which held that neither the AutoCAD lock nor the Auto Key lock were, by themselves, 
a computer program.20 The High Court unanimously found there to have been an infringement. Dawson J 
handed down the leading judgment, Mason CJ, Brennan J and Dean J in a joint judgment and Gaudron J in 
a separate judgment, concurring. Dawson J focussed on the operation of the Widget C which he found to be 
a computer program, and he found the AutoCAD lock to be a copy because the information in the 
AutoCAD lock matched a substantial part of the information in the Widget C. By copying the AutoCAD 
lock, the Auto Key lock infringed the copyright, Dawson J saying: ‘But copyright may be infringed by 
copying something which is a copy of the copyright work; indeed that is the most common form of 
infringement.’21  
 
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) amendments  
The decision in Autodesk was criticised by the Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC) in its 1995 
report entitled Computer Software Protection:22 
 
If the reasoning applied by Dawson J is of general application and not confined to the facts of the 
Autodesk case (the Committee is not aware of any reason why it should be so confined), it follows 
that other things which may not qualify for separate protection under the Act as computer 
programs may nonetheless be protected if they can properly be characterised as a substantial part 
of a computer program. For example a screen display that is the user interface of an otherwise 
original program, but which has been designed to resemble the screen display of another program, 
may infringe copyright in that other computer program even though the actual instructions of the 
‘look-alike’ program that generate the particular display are original. 
 
The conclusion that the look-up table was a substantial part of the Widget C program, with the 
result that copying of the look-up table constituted copying of that program, causes the Committee 
some concern. Further, the conclusion that the creation of the look-up table in Autokey from 
observation of the operation of Widget C and the AutoCAD lock was a copying of the look-up 
table in Widget C, even though the maker of Autokey (Mr Kelly) never saw that table, is also 
viewed by the Committee as a far-reaching and questionable extension of copyright. 
 
In its 1995 report the CLRC considered the protection of TPMs. While it was concerned by the approach of 
the High Court in the Autodesk case, it recognised that some protection should be afforded to the 
manufacturer. Submissions to the CLRC on the matter included the opinion that ‘locking’ a program was a 
way of protecting ideas; another point raised was that decompilation of locked programs should be 
permitted for the purposes of interoperability and error correction.23 Connected to this was a reference to 
the computer game market which, by the use of TPMs, restricts the playing of games to those of the 
particular manufacturer. Concern was expressed that by protecting TPMs the monopoly of the console 
                                                 
20 Autodesk v Dyason above n 14, paras 16-17, 24. 
21 Autodesk v Dyason above n 14, paras 26-28. 
22 Copyright Law Review Committee, Computer Software Protection (1995) paras 5.24-5.25. 
23 Ibid paras 10.90-10.92. 
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maker would be perpetuated.24 Another submission suggested that ‘any provision relating to program locks 
should be carefully confined to ensure that such locks could not be used to circumvent exceptions to the 
rights of copyright owners’.25 The ‘exceptions’ referred to are the ‘fair dealing’ (or defence) provisions in 
the CA, which permit limited use of ‘works’ or ‘other subject matter’ in certain circumstances. In the end 
the CLRC recommended that, subject to exceptions ‘for back-up copying, interoperability and error 
correction, the modification of a locked computer program for the purpose of circumventing the lock 
should be prohibited as should subsequent copying of such modified programs’.26 The CLRC also 
recommended that the CA be amended to give copyright owners the right to prevent the ‘manufacture, 
importation, distribution and possession for commercial purposes’ of circumvention devices.27  
 
In 1996 two treaties containing provisions referring to TPMs and circumvention devices were concluded by 
the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) – the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO 
Performers and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), as mentioned earlier. These provided that contracting parties 
would give ‘adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures …’, for authors in the case of the former treaty and for performers and producers of 
sound recordings in the case of the latter.28 The wording ‘adequate legal protection’ gives signatories some 
leeway in the manner in which they frame their legal remedies. Australia acceded to the WPPT and the 
WCT in April 2007, and they entered into force for Australia in July 2007.  
 
In August 2000 the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) was passed, and most of the 
provisions became effective on 4 March 2001. The amendments reflect some of the recommendations in 
the CLRC Report, and reflect also the above mentioned requirements for accession to the WCT and the 
WPPT. The importance of this legislation in the context of this article is that it introduced into the CA for 
the first time provisions relating to TPMs. Section 10(1) of the CA was amended to include a definition of 
both a TPM and a circumvention device, and in Part V (Remedies and Offences) was introduced a new 
Division 2A (Actions in relation to circumvention devices …). These provisions have since been amended 
by the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth), effective 01 January 2007, as a result of the obligations 
imposed on Australia by the AUSFTA. In the meanwhile the 2005 High Court decision in Stevens v 
Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment & Ors (Stevens),29 discussed later, had already 
demonstrated that the 2000 provisions, when construed narrowly, did not provide blanket protection for 
TPMs.  
 
                                                 
24 Ibid para 10.93. 
25 Ibid para 10.93. 
26 Ibid para 2.29. 
27 Ibid para 2.73. 
28 WIPO Copyright Treaty, art 11 and WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty, art 18. 
29 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment & Ors [2005] HCA 58. 
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The 2000 definition in section 10(1), said a ‘technological protection measure’ was a device or product 
designed in the ordinary course of its operation, to prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright in a 
work. This was done either by limiting availability, so access can only be gained by means of an access 
code, or through a copy control mechanism. A ‘circumvention device’ was defined as device having only a 
limited or no commercial purpose other than the circumvention of a technological protection measure. 
Section 116A and s 116D, in the new div 2A of pt V, gave the owner, or exclusive licensee, of copyright 
protected by a TPM a right of action and remedies in certain circumstances. Section 116A enabled the 
copyright owner, or exclusive licensee, to bring an action against a person who carried out the unauthorised 
manufacture, sale, hire, advertising, marketing, distribution for trade, exhibition, or importation of a 
circumvention device to circumvent the TPM. Section 116D provided civil and criminal remedies for 
actions under s 116A. These provisions did not, however, proscribe the use of a circumvention device. This 
is in contrast to the legislation in the United States which implemented the WCT, the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act 1998, by amending Title 17 of the United States Code. 17 USC §1201(a)(1)(A) provides ‘No 
person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under 
this title’.30 It is noteworthy that both the Australian and the US approach to the regulation of 
circumvention devices fell within the broad provisions of the WCT. 
 
The decision in Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment & Ors 
As mentioned earlier, the High Court decision in the Stevens case tested the amendments to the CA made 
by Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) in respect of TPMs and circumvention devices. 
In this case the applicants, Sony, contended that Eddy Stevens had contravened s 116A of the CA because 
he had installed a circumvention device (which came to be called a ‘mod chip’) into the Sony PlayStation 
console to circumvent Sony’s TPM. The PlayStation is a console that contains no actual games. The games 
are stored on CD-ROMs which are bought separately by the user. To play a game, the CD-ROM instructs 
the hardware in the PlayStation console and a game is transmitted to a screen. A normal CD-ROM can be 
burnt (copied) with a conventional CD burner. To prevent the piracy of its games, Sony put an access code 
in a section of the CD-ROM that conventional CD Burners could not write to. This meant that the access 
code was not copied when the rest of the data on the CD-ROM was being duplicated. Sony’s PlayStation 
had an internal device, called a ‘boot ROM’, that prevented CD-ROMs without the access code from 
instructing the console. CD-ROMs that were manufactured in different regions of the globe were given 
different access codes. As a result a game that was bought in the United States, for example, could not be 
played on a console bought in Australia, a different region. This combination of access code in the CD-
ROM and boot ROM in the console constituted the TPM, in a similar fashion to the Widget C and the 
AutoCAD lock in the AutoCAD product. Eddy Stevens, the respondent, who was unrepresented at trial, 
sold and installed ‘mod chips’. The mod chip was a device that allowed CD-ROMs without the requisite 
                                                 
30 Copyrights, 17 USC §1201 (2007). Circumvention of copyright protection systems (a) Violations regarding 
circumvention of technological measures (1)(A) <www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17> at1 May 2008). 
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access code to instruct the Sony PlayStation, thus enabling pirated CD-ROMs, and also CD-ROMs legally 
purchased in other regions such as the United States, to be played on Australian PlayStations.  
 
At trial, before Sackville J, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) was given 
leave to appear as amicus curiae. The ACCC contended that that Sony’s TPM was not, in the ordinary 
course of its operation, designed solely to prevent the infringement of copyright. The TPM was designed to 
inhibit the use of unauthorised copies of Sony’s works, including copies lawfully acquired from abroad. 
Accordingly, argued the ACCC, Stevens had not contravened s 116A as the TPM did not fall within the 
definition of TPM under s 10(1).31  
 
The ACCC’s narrow interpretation of 10(1) was based on policy rather than legislative intention. They 
believed that Sony’s device was implemented not only to prevent copyright infringement but also to create 
market segregation and limit competition. There are three regions for PlayStation games, North America, 
Japan (covering all of Asia) and Europe (including Australia). In a media release explaining the basis of the 
amicus curiae intervention, the ACCC commented: ‘… unfortunately Australian consumers still have to 
endure a significantly smaller range of game titles, at much higher prices, and for which it is not 
uncommon to be officially released into the Australian market well after they are released overseas’.32 
 
Sony’s response to the ACCC argument was that the definition of TPM in section 10(1) was satisfied so 
long as the protective devices, as a practical matter, minimised the incentive for persons to copy 
PlayStation games as a prelude to playing the copies on the PlayStation.33 Finding for Stevens, Sackville J 
preferred the ACCC’s narrow interpretation of s 10(1) stating:34 
 
[A] ‘technological protection measure’, as defined, must be a device or product which utilises 
technological means to deny a person access to a copyright work, or which limits a person’s 
capacity to make copies of a work to which access has been gained, and thereby ‘physically’ 
prevents or inhibits the person from undertaking acts which, if carried out, would or might infringe 
copyright in the work. It is in this sense that the device or product must be designed, in the 
ordinary course of its operation, to prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright in a work ... I 
do not think the definition is concerned with devices or products that do not, by their operations, 
prevent or curtail specific acts infringing or facilitating the infringement of copyright in a work, 
but merely have a general deterrent or discouraging effect on those who might be contemplating 
infringing copyright in a class of works. 
 
In Sackville J’s view a TPM had to be something that prevented the actual infringement of copyright from 
occurring. It was all a matter of timing: the PlayStation itself did not enable the unauthorised copyright 
                                                 
31 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2002] FCA 906, para 107(Sackville J) 
<www.austlii.edu.au> at 27 April 2008. 
32 ACCC, ‘ACCC defends the rights of Playstation owners’ (Press Release, 8 February 2002) <www.accc.gov.au> at 
27 April 2008. 
33 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens, above n 31, para 111. 
34 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens, above n 31, para 115. 
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infringement of the CD-ROMs to take place. Instead the TPM was there to prevent the use of CD-ROMs 
which were the result of previous unauthorised copying. It is important to note that if it were not for the 
narrow construction of s 10(1), Sackville J:35 
 
... would have held that the chips installed by Mr Stevens had only a limited commercially 
significant use other than circumventing or facilitating the circumvention of the access code. Thus, 
if the access code had been a ‘technological protection measure’, the chips would have been 
circumvention devices.  
 
On appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court, before French, Lindgren and Finkelstein JJ, the major 
point of difference between the primary judge and Full Court was the meaning of TPM as defined in s 
10(1) of the CA. The Full Court held unanimously that the definition of TPM in 10(1) covered Sony’s 
TPM, but their Honours followed different reasoning in coming to the same conclusion.36 In broad terms it 
could be said, however, that their Honours took a purposive approach when interpreting the relevant 
legislative provisions (i.e., they looked at the ‘purpose’ of the provisions). French J addressed the policy 
construction of 10(1) favoured by Sackville J:37 
 
In my opinion the proper construction of s 116A and the definition of ‘technological protection 
measure’ flows from a consideration of the ordinary and grammatical meaning of its language. 
There may be all manner of powerful policy considerations which can be extracted from the 
legislative history and other materials referred to in this case which favour the narrower reading of 
the definition of ‘technological protection measure’ preferred by the learned primary judge ... In 
the end, in my opinion, it is for the legislature to spell out the limiting words which may respond 
to such considerations. It is not for the Court to cage the ordinary meaning of the words which 
have been adopted by reference to policy considerations of its own divining. 
 
In the application to the High Court where Stevens sought special leave to appeal, Kirby J made the 
following observation:38  
 
The history of this form of technology has been one of struggle between those who have wanted to 
protect their intellectual property and those who have wanted to spread knowledge and ideas. I 
remember from the old days of the wire recorder at the very earliest days people were copying 
them and then came the sound recordings and then the video recording. There have always been 
people wanting to get at the ideas that are in them. One’s inclination is not to strike that down 
unless the law is clear, but on the other hand to give effect to the purpose of Parliament. 
 
In essence the task of the High Court was one of statutory interpretation of s 10(1).39 One of the principal 
issues for the justices who heard this case as it progressed through the appeal process was that the 
                                                 
35 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens, above n 31, para 167. 
36 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens, above n 31, paras 2, 12, 21, 25, 139, 189. 
37 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157, para 25 (French J) 
<www.austlii.edu.au> at 27 April 2008. 
38 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment & Ors [2004] HCA Trans 273 (6 August 2004) (Kirby J) 
<www.austlii.edu.au> at 27 April 2008. 
39 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment & Ors [2005] HCA 58, para 30 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne and Heydon JJ); para 102 (McHugh); para 168 (Kirby J) <www.austlii.edu.au> at 27 April 2008. 
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legislation did not specifically proscribe the ‘use’ of a circumvention device, unlike the USA, as noted 
earlier. The High Court made reference to this omission, saying on either construction the Justices were 
forced to imply legislative intention: ‘The result is that in the present case to fix upon one “purpose” and 
then bend the terms of the definition to that end risks “picking a winner” where the legislature has stayed its 
hand from doing so.’40 
 
In the end the High Court held unanimously that the TPM applied by Sony did not prevent infringement of 
copyright. The device only prevented access after infringement had occurred. Consequently, it was not 
covered by the definition of TPMs under 10(1), and s 116A was not contravened.41 
 
Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) 
As mentioned earlier, the CA was amended, effective 01 January 2007, to comply with the obligations 
imposed on Australia by the AUSFTA. Section 10(1) now defines a ‘technological protection measure’ as 
an ‘access control technological protection measure’ or a device, used by the owner of the copyright in a 
work that, in the normal course of its operation, ‘prevents, inhibits or restricts the doing of an act comprised 
in the copyright’.42 An ‘access control technological measure’, included in the CA for the first time, is 
defined in s 10(1) as a device which ‘in the normal course of its operation, controls access to the work or 
other subject matter’. Unlike the definition of a TPM, there is no reference here to preventing, inhibiting or 
restricting an act comprised in the copyright. Under the revised s 10(1) definition, a ‘circumvention device’ 
for a technological protection measure is defined as a device that ‘is promoted, advertised or marketed as 
having the purpose or use of circumventing the technological protection measure; or … as a device that has 
only a limited commercially significant purpose or use, or no such purpose or use, other than the 
circumvention ...’. This reform to the CA broadens the classifications of technological protection measure 
and circumvention device to the position where it is now harder to be excluded than it is to be included. 
Section 10 (1) outlines two exceptions to the definition of ‘technological protection measure’. Firstly, the 
definition expressly excludes devices that control geographic market segmentation by preventing the 
playback in Australia of a non-infringing copy of the work, a clear response to the Stevens case. Secondly, 
the definition expressly excludes devices that restrict the use of goods or services in relation to the device. 
For example, a protection measure that prevents third parties from making generic spare parts for a product 
that has copyright protection will not fall within the scope of this definition.43 These two exceptions are 
permissible under Article 17.4.7(e)(viii) of the AUSFTA and the first one allays some of the concerns 
expressed by the CLRC and the ACCC.  
                                                 
40 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment & Ors, above n 39, para 34 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
41 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment & Ors, above n 39, para 92 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne and Heydon JJ); para 107 (McHugh); para 228 (Kirby J).  
42 Section 10(1): a ‘device’ can be a product, technology, component or a computer program. The owner can be 
someone that has been granted a licence to, or given permission to, restrict access to the work of the owner. Work can 
also be other subject matter.  
43 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) 12.33. 
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The revised Division 2A of Part V replaces s 116A with ss 116AN, 116AO and 116AP. Section 116AN 
simplifies the rights of the copyright owner with respect to an ATPM. Now a copyright owner may bring an 
action where a work (or other subject matter) is protected by an ACTPM, and ‘a person does an act that 
results in the circumvention’ of the ACTPM, and that ‘person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the 
act would have that result’. In short, it is now illegal to circumvent an ATPM. There are a number of 
exceptions provided for in s 116AN; these are where the copyright owner grants permission, for the 
purposes of interoperability, encryption research, computer security testing, online privacy, law 
enforcement and national security, libraries and prescribed acts. Section 116AO and 116AP respectively 
enable a copyright owner to bring an action against a ‘manufacturer’ and a ‘provider’ of ‘a circumvention 
device for a technological protection measure’ (as noted earlier, the s 10(1) CA definition of TPM includes 




This article examines how the Australian law of copyright has managed the protection of a particular type 
of innovative technology, TPMs and, more recently, ACTPMs. The CA has been amended twice, once in 
2000 and again in 2006 in order to fulfil obligations arising from international treaties and the AUSFTA by 
proscribing the use in certain circumstances of circumvention devices. The 2000 amendments introduced 
protection for TPMs for the first time, and the necessity for the 2006 amendments demonstrate the speed at 
which developments occur in this area of technology. These developments are in the nature of the 
technology itself, and in the nature of the copyright protection that ensues. The changes made by the 2006 
amendments illustrate the difficulty in achieving and maintaining balance between the competing interests 
of copyright owners and copyright users in an environment far removed from the origins of copyright. 
 
 
